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ABSTRACT 
 This study estimates the government cost of revenue assurance, one of the many 
proposals for the 1995 Farm Bill.  Under the assumptions of nonnegativity and normality of 
revenue, a formula for computing the government cost of revenue assurance is derived.  This 
formula is employed to estimate per acre revenue assurance costs at the 70, 75, and 80 percent 
levels of expected revenue coverage.  These costs are compared with results from previous 
studies and with crop insurance premiums.  The relative impacts of changes in yield mean, yield 
standard deviation, and price-yield correlation are also explored through metamodel analysis.  
The costs estimated for revenue assurance show that this program would result in substantial 
budget savings over the current program. 
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ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF REVENUE ASSURANCE 
 
 The U. S. Congress is likely to consider alternative policies ranging from continuation of  
current farm programs to a complete restructuring of agricultural programs in the 1995 Farm Bill 
debate.  Increasingly vocal criticisms of existing agricultural policies are questioning their 
survivability, as expressed by Luther Tweeten (1993): 
 Six decades ago a generous uncle began assistance to an agricultural 
industry that had fallen on hard times.  That assistance is viewed as an 
entitlement, although agriculture now is financially resilient, dynamic, robust, and 
capable of adjusting to supply-demand shocks likely in future decades without 
income support. . . . Agriculture is no longer an industry of low income or low 
returns on resources nor would it be without commodity programs.  Commodity 
programs transfer income from lower income/wealth taxpayers to higher 
income/wealth producers.  Given the pressing need to promote economic 
efficiency and to reduce federal outlays and thereby the national debt, a strong 
case can be made for a transition program to end government intervention in 
agricultural markets. 
 A wide range of government programs is used to provide farmers with stable prices and 
incomes on the basis of the instability of agricultural production and prices.  Crop insurance and 
disaster relief programs seek to protect producers against yield loss.  The sum of three 
agricultural disaster assistance programs (crop insurance, emergency FmHA loans, and ASCS 
disaster relief payments) amounted to more than $25 billion between 1985 and 1993 at an annual 
average cost of $3.1 billion.  Most of these outlays represented payments to compensate farmers 
for yield shortfalls (Goodwin and Smith 1994). 
 One proposal, by the Iowa Farm Bill Study Team, would make fundamental changes in 
the structure of commodity programs by using a revenue protection program as a substitute for 
the existing target price, crop insurance, and disaster assistance programs.  This “Iowa Plan” 
proposes that producers be provided with catastrophic revenue assurance coverage equal to 70 
percent of the “normal” crop revenue.  “Normal” crop revenue is defined as the producer’s 
average yield for the past five years times the average county price for the same five years.  The 
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revenue assurance program would replace deficiency payments, crop insurance, and disaster 
assistance.  The acreage reduction program (ARP) and program crop acreage bases would be 
eliminated and producers would be allowed to plant any crop on any acres on their farms.  The  
U. S. government would continue to provide some price support through the Farmer Owned 
Reserve.  Appendix A provides details on the proposed revenue assurance specifications. 
 In short, revenue assurance is a guaranteed revenue plan that primarily evens out the 
fluctuations in farm revenue.  The guaranteed revenue is based upon historical crop yields and 
prices.  A farmer commits to a package that might substitute for current crop insurance, disaster 
payments, fixed target prices, and deficiency payments (Doering 1994; Harrington 1994). 
 This study provides estimates of the government cost of the revenue assurance program.  
Sensitivity analysis is also conducted by varying specifications such as the revenue assurance 
level.  Metamodels are estimated to examine the magnitudes of the effects of yield distributions 
and price-yield correlation on costs. 
 
Agricultural Risks and Statistical Relationships 
 Agricultural production involves numerous risks.  In crop production, three major 
components of farm income (price, yield, and production cost) involve risk.  Risk in production 
costs is usually relatively small so the major sources of risk are from price and yield.  Thus, gross 
revenue risk (revenue is price times yield) comprises the main component of farm-level risk and 
understanding farm-level revenue behavior is crucial to analyzing this risk.  Because price is 
usually negatively related to yield, the analysis is complex.  Preferably, distributions for yield, 
price, and revenue (for each crop and farmer) can be established reliably.  However, due to lack 
of farm-level data, it is usually difficult and time-consuming for such an attempt. 
 For two random variables, price and yield, if they are not independent (Mood, Graybill, 
and Boes, 1994, p. 180), then  
 
 E py p y pyb g = +µ µ σ ,                                                                              (1) 
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If they are independent, i.e., cov ,p y pyb g = =σ 0 , then 
 
 E py p yb g = µ µ , and V py y p p yb g = +µ σ µ σ2 2 2 2 .                                                     (3) 
 
 Specifications proposed by Iowa Farm Bill Study Group are briefly described here. Expected 
revenue from a crop on a farm (6) is proposed to be estimated using a 5-year moving average 
yield (4) times a 5-year moving average price (5).  The trigger revenue or guaranteed level can be 
specified as a proportion (α , say 70 percent) of the expected revenue (7). 
 
 ( ) ( )E y yt t-i=
=
∑1 5
1
5
i
                                                                               (4) 
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=
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1
5
i
                                                                               (5) 
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i
                                                                        (6) 
 R E p E yt t t= α b g b g                                                                                 (7) 
 
 Recall that E p y E p E yt t t t pyb g b g b g= + σ , where σpy  is the covariance between pt and yt .  
So E p y E p E yt t t tb g b g b g≠  when pt and yt  are correlated.  Specifically, E p y E p E yt t t tb g b g b g< when 
pt and yt  are negatively correlated (σpy < 0 ).  In order to account for negative price-yield 
correlation, E p yt tb g  is used in this study for estimating purposes rather than E p E yt tb g b g .  Table 
1 shows the average price-yield correlations by crop from 1984 through 1993. 
 
Table 1.  Average price-yield correlation, by crop, 1984-1993 
Crop Correlation  Crop Correlation 
Barley -0.10  Rice -0.16 
Corn -0.36  Sorghum -0.32 
Cotton -0.10  Soybeans -0.34 
Oats -0.13  Wheat -0.21 
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 Each farmer has a risk profile for each crop on the farm.  Different farmers will generally 
have quite different yield distributions (Goodwin 1994).  Also, there are price risks and price 
tends to be negatively correlated with yield.  If yield is low but price is high enough, a farmer 
may not face any economic hardship.  Revenue assurance provides protection only when it is 
needed; most farmers would seldom need payments under 70 or 80 percent of revenue assurance 
(Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes 1995).  When payments are needed, farmers with high revenue 
variability would gain more than farmers with low revenue variability at the same expected 
revenue.  The expected program cost (government cost of revenue assurance) can then be 
estimated according to the distribution of revenue and the revenue guarantee level.  Since 
revenue assurance is free to producers, the estimates for the expected payment received by 
farmers would be the same as expected cost to the government less administrative costs.  The 
costs of revenue assurance can be represented as 
 
 c R py p y dpdy
py
= −zz ( )f ,b g ,                                                                   (8) 
 
where R  is the revenue target and f p y,b g  is the joint probability density of yield and price that 
characterizes the revenue distribution. 
 Comparative statics indicate that as the revenue guarantee level increases, the cost of revenue 
assurance will increase (9).  As either price or yield variability rises, revenue assurance costs rise 
(10).  Also, revenue assurance costs are lower with more negative price-yield correlations (11): 
 
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂αc R c> ⇒ >0 0  ,                                                                      (9) 
 ∂ ∂σc p > 0 , ∂ ∂σc y > 0 , and                                                                       (10) 
 ∂ ∂σc py < 0 .                                                                                     (11) 
 
 While it is difficult to estimate a joint probability distribution of yield and price, an 
alternative method is to directly estimate a revenue distribution.  Revenue is calculated by price 
times yield.  Consider equation (12) as a substitute for equation (8): 
 
  
7
 
 c R r r dr
r
= −z ( )fb g ,                                                                            (12) 
 
where r py= and f rb g  is the revenue probability distribution.  This form implicitly considers the 
expected negative price-yield correlation. 
 Again, similar results to the previous case can be expected.  Higher revenue assurance 
costs are expected with higher revenue guarantee levels, higher price and/or yield variabilities, 
and less negative price-yield correlations (13).  The impacts of the variabilities and the 
correlation come through their effects on the variability of revenue, 
 
 ∂ ∂c R > 0 ; ∂σ ∂σr p > 0 , ∂σ ∂σr y > 0 , ∂σ ∂σr py < 0 , ∂ ∂σc r > 0 .                   (13) 
 
 Yield, price, and/or revenue variability will change depending on aggregation level.  The 
variability will increase at lower levels of aggregation.  For example, farm-level yield variability 
would be higher than that at the state level.  The implication of this variability difference is that 
the estimated cost for revenue assurance would appear higher at the farm level than at the county 
or state level.  Specifically, we have: 
 
 σ σ σf c s f c sc c c≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ ≥ .                                                                   (14) 
 
 Assuming price is negatively correlated with yield, cost will be overestimated when price-
yield correlation is ignored.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.  When price is independent on yield, 
revenue is given by a straight line, such as py .  When price is negatively correlated with yield, 
the revenue line is concave, a quadratic, for example, as p(y)y .  For a guaranteed level R , 
revenue assurance payment zone is A when price is negatively correlated with yield, and (A + B) 
when price is independent on yield.  The difference in cost is B. 
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Figure 1.  Revenue assurance payout zone
Revenue
($/acre)
Yield
(bu/acre)
_
R
__
py
____
p(y)y
A
B A = Payout zone with the
       price-yield correlation
A + B = Payout zone without the
              price-yield correlation
 
 
 Yield, price, and/or revenue variability can be compared with and without revenue 
assurance to examine the effectiveness of the proposed program.  The effectiveness of revenue 
assurance would depend on the assurance guarantee level, and yield, price, and revenue 
distributions.  In estimating yield mean and variability, some previous studies have used 
detrended yields (Skees and Reed, 1986; Miranda, 1991).  Yield variability around a trend yield 
would be less than that actual yields.  Use of actual yields without detrending would increase 
yield variability estimates and therefore revenue variability.  The cost of revenue assurance 
would be overestimated without detrending yield.  Because yield data are available for only a 
small number of years (10 years, from 1984 to 1993), no obvious trend is observed for this 
period.  Yield is therefore not detrended. 
 Moral hazard could be a potential problem under revenue assurance.  A farmer might 
have no incentive to seek the highest price when yield is known and price cannot make revenue 
to exceed the assurance level.  For example, when yield is know at y0 , a farmer would be 
indifferent among price levels as long as the highest possible price cannot make revenue exceed 
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the assurance level.  In this case, another party can take the advantage by buying at a low price 
and selling for a profit.  Using the market price to establish the guarantee level could mitigate the 
problem.  Similarly, farmers may be encouraged to have a crop failure at low yields rather than 
harvest additional bushels of the crop at additional harvest expense per bushel as there is a wide 
range of yield where gross revenue remains the same (Doering 1994).  
 
The Revenue Assurance Cost Formula 
 Under the assumptions of normality of gross revenue and nonnegativity of revenue, the 
per acre cost of revenue assurance can be estimated for each analytical unit (say, insurance unit, 
IU).  The normal density function for R, with mean µ and variance σ2 , is given by 
 
 ( ) ( )( )f R R= − −1
2
05
2
2
πσ
µ σexp . ( ) .                                                       (15) 
 
The truncated density function for R imposing revenue nonnegativity is defined by 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )f R R 0 f RPr R 0 R 0 R   for R 0≥ = ≥ = ≥ − − ≥−Pr exp . ( )1 2 212 05πσ µ σ .      (16) 
 
The term Pr R ≥ 0b g  is derived as 
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Then we have 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )f R R 0 R  .≥ = − −−Φ µ σ
πσ
µ σ/ exp . ( )1
2
21
2
05                                   (18) 
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 Let the revenue assurance level be λµ, where 0 1≤ ≤λ .  Government cost for revenue 
assurance is defined as 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
( )[ ] ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
c R f R R 0 R R f R R= − ≥ = −
= − − + − −




∫ ∫−
−
λµ µ σ λµ
µ σ σ
π
λ µ σ λ µΦ λ µ σ
λµ λµ
d d
0
1
0
1 2
2
05 1 1 1
Φ
Φ
/
/ exp . / / .
                (19) 
 
Once the parameter λ  is specified and µ and σ are estimated for a unit (a crop on a farm, a 
county, a state, or the United States), the per acre cost of revenue assurance can then be 
calculated using the formula in (19). 
 Let the revenue assurance cost for a farmer in a particular state be csf .  State average cost on 
revenue assurance ( Cs ) is calculated as 
 
 C F cs
1
sf
f 1
F
=
−
=
∑ .                                                                                                         (20) 
 
Let the corn acreage in a state be ( As ).  Federal government costs of revenue assurance less 
administrative costs ( GC ) is calculated as 
 
 GC C As s
s 1
S
=
=
∑ .                                                                                                            (21) 
 
The Empirical Data 
 The eight crops included in this study are barley, corn, cotton, oats, rice, sorghum, 
soybeans, and wheat.  Actual Production History (APH) yield data are from the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation (FCIC).  The APH data set contains ten years of historical yield data from 
1984 through 1993 with records at the insurance unit (IU) level.  Only actual yield data are used 
in the analysis and yield data that are doubtful are deleted.  For example, records with yields 
higher than 400 bushels per acre for corn are deleted.  Yield records that are missing for any year 
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in the ten-year period and duplicate records are also deleted.  The number of records for each 
crop is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Number of insurance units for the eight crops 
Crop No. Records  Crop No. Records  Crop No. Records 
Corn 36619  Sorghum 3460  Barley 427 
Wheat 16449  Cotton 1689  Oats 66 
Soybeans 15071  Rice 567  Total 77348 
 
 Price data for each crop and state are used in calculating gross revenue for each IU in a 
particular year.  The mean and standard deviation of gross revenue over time are calculated for 
each IU.  Data at micro-level is limited to perform a reliable statistical test regarding normality of 
revenue.  Instead, a test on normality of revenue is performed using state-level data. 
 The Shapiro-Wilk test is used for testing 1980-1993 state-level revenue data for 
normality.  In this test, the Shapiro-Wilk statistic, W, is calculated with small values of W 
leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis of normality.  W is the ratio of two variance 
estimators:  the best estimator based upon the square of a linear combination of order statistics 
and the corrected sum of squares estimator.  W is bound between zero and one and has a highly 
skewed distribution.  To obtain significance levels for W, Royston’s approximate normalizing 
transformation (22) is applied to convert W into a standard normal variate, Z. 
 
 ( )( )Z W= − −−σ µγ1 1 ,                                                                                                (22) 
 
where σ, γ, and µ are functions of the number of observations and are estimated from simulation 
results.  Large values for Z indicate departures from normality (SAS 1992, p.627-28).  The SAS 
statistical package provides probabilities for the Shapiro-Wilk statistic in this manner.  If the 
probability level is less than the chosen significance level, then the null hypothesis of normality 
can be rejected.  Several states are tested for each crop.  Table 3 reports the results of the 
Shapiro-Wilk tests.  From these results, it appears the assumption of normally distributed 
revenues is justifiable.  Of the 125 crop-state combinations examined, only 8 state crop revenues 
can reject the assumption of a normal distribution. 
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Table 3.  Results from the Shapiro-Wilk Test for Normality of Revenue, 1980-1993 
 
 
Crop 
 
    Number of states   
            tested 
    Number of states 
     where normality 
       is not rejected 
Barley                14                 14 
Corn                23                 18 
Cotton                  8                   7 
Oats                15                 15 
Rice                  6                   4 
Sorghum                  9                   9 
Soybeans                25                 25 
Wheat                25                 25 
   
Total              125               117 
                          Note:  at the 5 percent level of significance. 
 
 Based on the FCIC yield data and state-level farm prices, farm revenues are computed 
over the 1984 to 1993 period.  From these revenues, estimates of the farm-level coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation/mean) of revenue are formed for the eight crops.  Forecasted state-
level values of farm prices, acres planted, and yields computed from regional FAPRI revenue 
assurance scenario figures are combined with the estimated farm-level coefficient of variation of 
revenue from the FCIC data set to complete the needed data for the revenue assurance cost 
estimates for 1996-2003.  Table 4 contains the estimated coefficients of variation for the crops. 
Corn, rice, and soybeans have the lowest coefficients of revenue variation, while cotton and oats 
have the highest. 
Table 4.  Coefficients of revenue variation by crop, 1984-1993 
Crop Coefficient of Variation 
Barley 0.3266547 
Corn 0.2739777 
Cotton 0.3978268 
Oats 0.4406353 
Rice 0.2782905 
Sorghum 0.3413951 
Soybeans 0.2460898 
Wheat 0.3638209 
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Revenue Assurance Cost Estimates 
 The expected per acre cost of revenue assurance is estimated using equation (19).  The λ 
is set at 0.7, 0.75, and 0.8 to estimate revenue assurance costs for coverage levels of 70, 75, and 
80 percent of revenue.  The µ is computed dynamically as the average revenue for the crop for 
each state over the previous 5 years and σ is computed as µ multiplied by the farm-level revenue 
coefficient of variation for the crop.  This formulation of σ gives the state-level revenue farm-
level revenue variability, a key component of the costs of a revenue assurance program. 
 
Table 5.  The 1996-2003 average per acre and total revenue assurance costs 
and average acreage covered 
 
Crop 
 
Acres  
            Per Acre Cost 
   70%        75%        80% 
               Total Cost 
    70%         75%        80% 
 (mill.)   ($/acre)    (mill. $)  
Barley 5.32  3.24 4.26 5.51  17.2 22.6 29.3 
Corn 80.41  5.41 7.66 10.60  435.4 616.6 852.9 
Cotton 12.40  18.68 23.09 28.24  231.6 286.3 350.2 
Oats 4.43  4.95 5.97 7.13  21.9 26.4 31.6 
Rice 2.48  8.62 12.12 16.65  21.3 30.0 41.2 
Sorghum 11.05  5.11 6.62 8.45  56.5 73.2 93.5 
Soybeans 62.49  2.71 4.06 5.90  169.3 253.7 369.0 
Wheat 72.52  5.33 6.76 8.47  386.6 490.5 614.4 
Total 251.09  5.33 7.16 9.48  1339.9 1799.4 2382.2 
 
 The revenue assurance costs are average costs for the 1996-2003 projection period.  The 
cost of revenue assurance differs by crop.  The 1996-2003 average per acre and total revenue 
assurance costs and average total acres covered by crop are given in Table 5.  Soybeans has the 
lowest average per acre costs of revenue assurance at the 70 percent coverage level at $2.71; 
cotton has the highest at $18.68.  Overall, average per acre revenue assurance costs at the 70 
percent coverage level is $5.33.  Average costs rise to $5.90, $28.24, and $9.48 for soybeans, 
cotton, and the total for 80 percent coverage.  Corn revenue assurance costs per acre are $5.41, 
$7.66, and $10.60 for the 70, 75, and 80 percent coverage levels.  Wheat revenue assurance costs 
per acre are $5.33, $6.76, and $8.47 for the 70, 75, and 80 percent coverage levels.  Average total 
costs for revenue assurance are $1.34 billion for 70 percent coverage and $2.38 billion for 80 
percent coverage. 
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Table 6.  The 1996-2003 average per acre revenue assurance costs 
by state and crop 
 
Crop 
 
State 
Per Acre Costs        
70%       75%      80% 
   ($/acre)  
Corn Illinois 5.84 8.26 11.43 
Corn Iowa 5.54 7.84 10.85 
Cotton Mississippi 24.91 30.80 37.68 
Cotton Texas 14.67 18.13 22.18 
Rice Arkansas 8.24 11.58 15.91 
Rice California 11.40 16.02 22.01 
Rice Texas 9.89 13.91 19.11 
Soybeans Illinois 3.11 4.66 6.77 
Soybeans Iowa 3.08 4.62 6.72 
Wheat Kansas 4.74 6.01 7.53 
Wheat North Dakota 4.75 6.03 7.55 
 
 The cost of revenue assurance differs by state.  Table 6 contains the 1996-2003 average 
per acre revenue assurance costs for selected states and crops.  Per acre costs of revenue 
assurance for corn in Iowa range from $5.84 for 70 percent coverage to $11.43 for 80 percent 
coverage.  In Kansas, wheat per acre costs of revenue assurance are $4.75 for 70 percent 
coverage and $7.53 for 80 percent coverage.  Cotton shows some of the largest variation in state-
level per acre revenue assurance costs.  For example, at 70 percent coverage,  per acre costs of 
revenue assurance for Mississippi and Texas differ by more than $10.  This difference increases 
to more than $15 at 80 percent coverage. 
 Analytically, it is logical that the revenue assurance cost should be less than the yield 
insurance cost (premium) under that same percentage coverage if there is any negative price-yield 
correlation.  Rain and Hail Insurance Services has provided cost estimates for 69 percent yield 
coverage for corn.  Table 7 displays estimated state-level average costs for revenue assurance and 
yield insurance for corn.  For 69 percent yield coverage, per acre costs are $8.57 in Iowa and 
$9.81 in Illinois.  These numbers are compared to per acre costs of $5.54 in Iowa and $5.84 in 
Illinois under 70 percent assurance.  Average per acre cost is $9.13 for 69 percent yield coverage 
versus $5.41 for 70 percent assurance.  Estimates on revenue assurance costs are comparable to 
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those reported in Harwood et al (1994).  However, the estimates here are higher than in Harwood 
et al. but they follow a similar ranking among states. 
 
Table 7.  Comparison of revenue assurance and yield insurance 
per acre costs for corn 
State 70%, FAPRI 70%, Harwood et al. 69%, RHIS 
  ($/acre)  
Illinois 5.84 4.74 9.81 
Indiana 6.07 4.17 9.94 
Iowa 5.54 2.36 8.57 
Minnesota 5.22 4.04 8.90 
Nebraska 5.85 4.26 8.01 
US Average 5.41 4.06 9.13 
 
 There are several differences in estimating costs of revenue assurance.  First, state prices 
rather than the U.S. prices are used here.  Second, yield is not detrended here.  Third, expected 
cost of revenue assurance for each IU is estimated assuming a normal distribution for revenue.  
Fourth, an adjusted distribution is used by imposing a restriction of nonnegative gross revenue.  
Harwood et al. does not impose distributional assumptions but instead uses the empirical data.  
Also, different time periods are examined.  Therefore, while the differences in costs can not be 
solely attributed to price effects (different data sets are used), price is certainly one major reason 
for the difference. 
 Table 8 reports estimates on government program expenditures of the current program 
and the revenue assurance program.  Average yearly payments under the revenue assurance 
programs have been computed with and without transitional payments.  The transitional 
payments are computed by taking a fixed percentage of the average total deficiency payments 
over the period 1991 to 1995 (actual for 1991-94, projected 1995).  For example, in 1996 the 
transitional payment is equal to 80 percent of this average total deficiency payment.  In 1997, the 
transitional payment is 60 percent of this average and so on.  The current program payouts are 
projected deficiency payments over the period.  Under the 70 percent coverage level, average 
revenue assurance payments are over three billion dollars less than average deficiency payments 
even when transitional payments are included.  Even at the 80 percent coverage level,  the 
average budgetary savings from the revenue assurance program is more than $2 billion. 
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Table 8.  Average yearly payments under the current program 
and revenue assurance, 1996-2003  
 Without 
Transitional 
Payments 
With 
 Transitional 
 Payments 
 (billion $) 
Current Program 6.07 6.07 
70% Revenue Assurance 1.34 2.88 
75% Revenue Assurance 1.80 3.34 
80% Revenue Assurance 2.38 3.92 
 
Metamodel Analysis 
 To characterize relationships between the cost of revenue assurance, yield distributions, 
and price-yield correlations, a metamodel is specified in (23).  A metamodel is a model of 
simulated results or a model of results from various studies.  A metamodel represents research 
findings in a more systematic and statistical way so that systematic relationships are more likely 
to be discovered if they exist.  Analysis using metamodels can be performed across a number of 
studies, on multiple findings within one study, or both.  The basic assumption underlying a 
metamodel is that each study (simulation) result is an observation that can be thought of as one 
data point in a larger dataset containing all possible observations, given the true relationship 
being studied (Marra and Schurle 1994).  There are two major questions posed by metamodel 
analysis:  (1) Is the effect of factor x on outcome y significant, and (2) What is the size of the 
effect of factor x on outcome y (Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson 1982)?  A metamodel is then a 
useful tool for establishing empirical relationships among variables of interests.  It is a simple 
analytical tool capable of abstracting relationships among interested variables (Bouzaher et al. 
1993).  A major advantage of a metamodel is that it contains essential information of numerous 
results in a compressed form.  It can therefore be used to “predict” the effects that may not be 
included in the simulations due to high costs and impracticality of exhausting all simulation 
possibilities.  Metamodel (23) is estimated under various assurance levels.  The metamodel is 
used to examine the effects of distributional parameters of yield and price-yield correlation: 
  
 csf s s sf
y
s sf
y
s sf
y
sf= + + + + ∀α β µ γ σ η ρ ε       s ,                                                   (23) 
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where µ σsfy sfy,  are the mean and standard deviation of yield for each IU, and ρsfy  is the price-yield 
correlation.  Parameters β γ η, ,  and  are the effects of yield mean and standard deviation, and 
price-yield correlation.  While the effect of mean yield is expected to be negative, the effects of 
yield standard deviation and price-yield correlation are expected to be positive. 
 
Table 9.  Metamodel results for corn 
Revenue 
Assurance 
Level 
 
 
Intercept 
 
Mean Yield 
Effect 
Std. Dev. 
Yield 
Effect 
Price-Yield 
Correlation 
Effect 
 
 
R2 
70% 2.7632 
(39) 
-0.0683 
(153) 
0.4447 
(442) 
8.1522 
(177) 
0.88 
75% 2.9646 
(42) 
-0.0709 
(160) 
0.5237 
(523) 
9.6752 
(212) 
0.91 
80% 3.1508 
(46) 
-0.0686 
(157) 
0.6037 
(615) 
11.3035 
(252) 
0.93 
         Note:  Absolute t-values are in parentheses. 
 
 Metamodel (23) is estimated for each crop.  In Table 9, three metamodels are reported for 
corn in all states under 70, 75 and 80 percent assurance.  All estimates have the correct signs as 
expected and are statistically significant at the 1 percent probability level.  The metamodels 
appear robust and adequately characterize the effects of distributional parameters of yield and 
revenue on expected costs. 
 These metamodels are used to examine the effects of yield distribution on cost. Results 
indicate that the relative effect of mean level is small (-6.83 to -7.09 cents) but the relative effect 
of standard deviation is large (44.47 to 60.37 cents).  Correlation between price and yield affects 
cost in a way that the larger the negative correlation, the lower the cost.  It has a relatively large 
effect on cost.  For example, the per acre cost difference between farmers with a weak price-yield 
correlation (for example, -0.10) and with a strong correlation (for example, -0.40) can be high at 
$2.45, $2.90, and $3.40 under 70, 75 and 80 percent assurance levels.  Negative price-yield 
correlation exists and this correlation has a large effect on cost.  Similar results are found for 
other crops that are not reported here. 
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 The implications of these results are important.  Regional difference in cost of revenue 
assurance can be attributed to regional differences in yield variability and price-yield correlation.  
First, states and production regions with high yield variability would benefit more than those 
with low yield variability.  For example, average farm-level corn yield variability has 27 percent 
of coefficient of variation (mean of 126 and standard deviation of 34) in the Corn Belt, and 37 
percent of coefficient of variation (mean of 89 and standard deviation of 33) in the Southeast.  
This would result in a $2.08 per acre higher benefit in the Southeast than in the Corn Belt.  
Second, major production states and regions affect the market more than minor production 
regions and major production regions would benefit less than minor production regions.  For 
example, average price-yield correlation is -0.40 in the Corn Belt and -0.19 in the Northeast.  
This would result in a $1.71 per acre higher benefit in the Northeast than in the Corn Belt.  Third, 
any estimation procedure that ignores price-yield correlation effect or assumes an unreasonable 
correlation value in estimating revenue assurance cost would certainly bias results. 
 
Summary and Concluding Comments 
 This study employs an expected cost approach to estimate government cost for the 
proposed revenue assurance program.  Per acre costs by state and crop, together with estimated 
state acreages for each crop, are used to estimate government cost for each crop in each state.  
Total government cost is then summed over crop and state.  The cost of revenue assurance is then 
compared with the costs of the current programs, yield insurance, and other revenue assurance 
cost estimates.  
 Budgetary savings would depend on specifications of transitional payments from the 
current programs to a revenue assurance program.  Government cost is estimated to be $1.34 
billion to ensure a 70 percent gross revenue for eight crops.  Deficiency payments averaged $5.4 
billion between fiscal years 1985 and 1992 and peaked at $6.3 billion in 1985 (Harwood et al. 
1994).  Projected costs for current (1992/93) deficiency and disaster payments are $6.9 billion 
($4.3 billion for deficiency and $2.6 billion for disaster payments) (Doering 1994).  The sum of 
three agricultural disaster assistance programs (crop insurance, emergency FmHA loans, and 
ASCS disaster relief payments) amounted to more than $25 billion between 1985 and 1993 at an 
annual average cost of $3.1 billion (Goodwin and Smith 1994).  The estimated revenue assurance 
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costs show substantial savings over these current programs.  Both national- and state-level 
revenue assurance costs are provided here.  The costs of revenue assurance differ both by state 
and crop.  Metamodel analysis indicates the price-yield correlation has a major impact on the per 
acre costs of revenue assurance. 
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION AND SPECIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSED 
 REVENUE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 
 
 
• Crops Covered 
Program crops, soybeans, alfalfa, and other hay 
Hay is harvested forage only, not grazing: uses existing grazing rules 
• Base Acres 
No base acres 
• Set Asides and 0/50/85 programs are eliminated. 
• Target Prices and Deficiency Payments 
Revenue assurance eliminates target prices and deficiency payments. 
However, during the phase-in period, a declining proportion of a fixed/frozen expected 
deficiency payment would be made.  Base deficiency payments would be calculated as a 5 
year average of historical payments.  The base would be multiplied by .8, .6, .4, and .2, 
respectively over a four year period and 0, thereafter. 
• Flex: Revenue assurance allows 100 percent flex, at least conceptually. 
• Nine Month Recourse loans exist under Revenue Assurance;  non-recourse loans are 
eliminated. 
• Marketing Loans are eliminated. 
• No CCC Stocks 
• Farmer Owned Reserve is continued under revenue assurance.  No Rule changes were 
planned. 
• EEP, Deip, MPP, etc. are retained. 
• CRP: Use Baseline Assumption on CRP expiration/continuation. 
• Conservation Compliance - No Green Payments 
Conservation compliance is required to be eligible for Revenue Assurance payments. 
No additional green payment programs in initial scenarios. 
• Revenue Assurance Rate (70-80% of expected revenue) - initially 70% in analysis 
• Revenue Assurance Price (5 year moving average of posted county price, annual) 
• Revenue Assurance Yield (5 year moving average of proven yield) 
• Time Periods: Begins in 1996 or as soon as implementable. Would have a five year phase in 
period during which the proportional deficiency payment would be phase down. 
• Added funding for research and market development -- a high proportion (yet to be 
determined) of budgetary savings would be allocated to agricultural research, product and 
market development.  
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